

Digital Defender Partnership - July 2023

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#### Context for this talk

 Started as a discussion among friends about how gender-based violence was a non-existing conversation in hacker / free software groups

 We created a non-profit organization called Echap to help women shelters and organizations working with survivors

 Our work / experience focused on domestic violences for people being supported by women shelters

## **Today**

- Let's talk about cyber-violences in intimate partner violences
- Different types of cyber-violences
- How to disconnect from your ex
- Checking online accounts
- Checking devices with some forensic

#### How-to

- We have shared pads for notes / questions. Feel free to add notes and questions in English or Spanish
- You can ask questions in the chat
- Not a lot of space for interactive learning, but there is a learning exercise for after the session in the pad
- There are lots of resources for after this talk + slides will be shared
- Get in touch!

#### **Disclaimer**

/!\ This is a collective work, I am sharing here work done by Echap and many other people

## **Content Warning**

We will talk about domestic violence, abuse and I will share some real-life examples of online domestic abuse

# **Cyber-violences**

#### Cyberviolences

#### Harassment.

- Mostly on social media
- Can be group harassment (e.g. Gamergate)
- In domestic violence, often one person harassment
- Fake accounts on social media

#### Cyber-control

- Using technology to increase control on the survivor's life
- Extend control outside of the house
- Asking for regular message, photos, videos
- Control of interactions online

#### Cyber-surveillance

- Intrusion in smartphones, emails etc.
- Stalkerware
- Tracking geolocation
- Intrusion in administrative accounts
- Using kids devices

## **Cyber-control**

- Control is a key part of domestic abuse
- Technology allows to extend this control outside of the house
- Ex: In France, 90% of domestic violence survivors declared that their partner required them to be reachable all the time (Hubertine Auclert 2018)

#### **Online Harassment**

- Harassment can take very different forms depending on the context
- We generally think of harassment as online mobs (e.g. Gamer Gate)
- In intimate partner violence, harassment is generally done by few people:
  - Fake accounts in the name of the survivor
  - Non consensual publication of photos
  - Messages
  - Threats (80% in France HA 2018)

## Digital surveillance

- Very common when a large part of digital life is shared with the abuser
- Passwords can be shared and reused, hard to know what the abuser has access to
- Very little space for privacy in abusive relations
- Most common cases are: password stolen, phone connected to the account
- Smartphones allow to share geolocation through standard apps

#### **Administrative violences**

- Confiscation of administrative documents
- Control of most online accounts: bank, social services, taxes, phone plan etc.
- Bank details can be modified after separation to steal money
- Administrative surveillance: medical information, list of calls etc.

#### **Stalkerware**





**Easiest Steps to Install Android Spy App (Remote Installation)** 

# Easiest Steps to Install Android Spy App (Remote Installation) THETRUTHSPY EDITOR - JULY 4, 2023

DOWNLOAD NOW

3 Easiest Ways to Spy My Wife's Phone for Free Without Her Knowing

THETRUTHSPY EDITOR - JUNE 29, 2023

3 Easiest Ways to Track Someone's Snapchat Messages

THETRUTHSPY EDITOR - JUNE 20, 2023

3 Easiest Ways to Track Other's Facebook Messages

THETRUTHSPY EDITOR - JUNE 11, 2023

3 Easiest Ways to Track Someone's Text Messages Without Their Phone

THETRUTHSPY EDITOR - MAY 30, 2023



#### **Stalkerware**


- Spyware products used on intimate partner violence
- Cost between 10\$ and 30\$ / month
- It is awful

#### But

- Stalkerware is the "cool tech topic" for media while it's probably a small minority of cases
- A lot of digital surveillance techniques exist that are easier and cheaper
- We won't solve the stalkerware issue without solving the violence issue
- We need to be careful with techno-solutionism

## **Internet of Things**









IoT

Abuse

# Source: Abuse Vectors: A Framework for Conceptualizing IoT-Enabled Interpersonal

Context
Shared-use devices
Personal-use devices

Context

Category
Home control
Smart appliances
Security systems
Vehicles
Tracking devices
Entertainment
Covert spying technologies

Device	
Smart speaker Control tablet	
TV Thermostat Lights Router Plug Kettle Smoke alarm Fridge Mattress	
Doorbell Security camera General camera Baby monitor Lock Motion sensor Presence sensor Garage door opener	
Car Car accessory	
Watch Item tracker	
Bluetooth headphones Smart toy	
Hidden camera Spy drone Thermal camera Listening device Landline recorder	
GPS tracker USB keylogger	

Discussed S	trategies
Spy	Harass
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Abuse

Vectors

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## Airtags, cameras, GPS trackers







#### **Clinical Computer Security for Victims of Intimate Partner Violence**


Sam Havron\*,1 Diana Freed\*,1 Rahul Chatterjee1 Damon McCoy2
Nicola Dell1 Thomas Ristenpart1

1 Cornell Tech 2 New York University

Clients & Devices		Chief Concerns		<b>Detected Issues</b>	
Clients seen	44	Worried about tech abuse/tracking/spyware	18	Clients w/ vulnerabilities	23
Consultations performed	46	Abuser hacked accounts or knows secrets	20	Clients w/ unsolved problems	
Devices seen	105	Worried abuser was tracking their location	10	Clients w/ no problems detected	19
Devices manually inspected	97	Phone is glitchy Abuser calls from unknown numbers	10	Potential spyware detected	3
Devices scanned w/ ISDi	75		9	Potential password compromise	14
Median devices per client	2	Unrecognized app on child's phone	1 4	Presence of unknown "trusted" devices	12
Max devices per client	7	Money missing from bank account		Shared family/phone plan	4
Median apps per scanned device	170	Curious and want to learn about privacy		Rooted device	1

and tested a range of new technical and non-technical tools that systematize the discovery and investigation of the complicated, multimodal digital attacks seen in IPV. An initial field study with 44 IPV survivors showed how our procedures and tools help victims discover account compromise, exploitable misconfigurations, and potential envivore.

shown how abusers exploit technology to harass, impersonate, threaten, monitor, intimidate, and otherwise harm their victims [8, 14, 19, 20, 27, 35, 43]. Prevalent attacks include account compromise, installation of spyware, and harassment on social media [20,27]. In many cases digital attacks can lead to physical violence, including even murder [34]. Unfortu-



# **Activity!**

Share in the pad some forms of cyber-violences you have encountered in your work that are missing in this list

# **Disconnect from your ex**

## Shared life

## Leaving

## Separated Life

Living with an abusive partner who physically control and monitor how technology is used.

Limited possibilities for privacy and high risk of reprisal.

Key aspect is to secure communications with the survivor without adding more risks to the situation.

Attempt to leave the perpetrator.

Need privacy to prepare departure and have physical protection in new place.

Often a key moment to stay safe and disconnect from the abuser

Continue life without the abuser, both online and offline.

Need to stay connected with close people to have support.

Sometime need to stay in touch with the abuser and manage that securely.

Risk of harassment



#### **How to disconnect**

#### Tech Disconnect Short Form

Compiled by the Clinic to End Tech Abuse

Last Updated: July 2, 2020

#### What is this?

We have created a checklist of ways you may still be connected with your ex-partner online or on your devices. These connections may let them continue to get information about your life.

If you are concerned that any of the actions we suggest below will increase any risks to your safety, we strongly recommend that you consult with a case worker at a domestic violence organization -- or other appropriate support organization -- beforehand.

#### Checklist



#### **How to disconnect**

- List online accounts
  - Email, social networks but also administrative accounts (social services, bank...)
- List devices
  - List connected accounts (Google, iCloud)
- Pick a solid password strategy
- Change passwords
- Do specific checks on email and social media accounts
- Secure the devices



# **Checking Online Accounts**

## **Key part of disconnecting / digital security**

- Changing passwords is good, but not enough for social media / email accounts
- Different ways to keep access to the account exist
  - Phones connected to the account
  - App passwords
  - Auto forward
  - Apps etc.

## **Ex Google**

#### Activity on this account

This feature provides information about the last activity on this mail account and any concurrent activity. Learn more

This account is open in 2 other locations. (Location may refer to a different session on the same computer.)

#### Concurrent session information:


Access Type [ ? ] (Browser, mobile, etc.)	Location (IP address) [?]
Authorised Application	France (
Browser	France (

#### Visit Security Check-up for more details

#### Recent activity:


Access Type [?] (Browser, mobile, POP3, etc.)	Location (IP address) [ 2 ]	Date/Time (Displayed in your time zone)
Browser (Chrome) Show details	* France	02:19 (0 minutes ago)
Authorised Application () Show details	France (	02:18 (0 minutes ago)
Browser (Chrome) Show details	France (	02:16 (2 minutes ago)
Authorised Application () Show details	France	02:15 (3 minutes ago)
Browser (Chrome) Show details	France (	01:00 (1 hour ago)
Browser (Chrome) Show details	France (	00:35 (1.5 hours ago)
Mobile	France (	23:51 (2 hours ago)
Mobile	France (	21:57 (4 hours ago)
Mobile	France (	15:30 (10 hours ago)
Mobile	France (	) 13 Jul (12 hours ago)

## **Ex: Google**





## Ex: Google



#### **Risks of Social Networks**

- Hacking or access to the account: shared or stolen password etc.
- Control: stalking, gathering personal information etc.
- Harassment: messages, threats, fake accounts...

# **Break - 10 minutes**

# **Securing Devices**

# **iPhones**

#### **iPhones**



- There are many ways to share data on an iPhone, that can be used by an abusive partner
- Stalkerware apps are quite rare, they actually use access to iCloud data and backups

#### **Share Geolocation**

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT210514

# Find people and share your location with Find My

Learn how to use the Find My app to share your location with friends and family members. You can even set up location-based notifications, so that you know if someone left a location or just arrived home.



The Find My app combines Find My iPhone and Find My Friends into a single app. If you need help finding it, use Search on your iPhone, iPad, or iPod touch or use Spotlight on your Mac.

#### Share your location

When Share My Location is turned on, you can share your location with friends, family, and contacts from your iPhone, iPad, or iPod touch with Find My. You can also share your location in the Find People app on watchOS 6 or later with Apple Watch models that have GPS and cellular and are paired with your iPhone.

If you already set up Family Sharing and use Location Sharing, your family members automatically appear in Find My.


You can also share your location in Messages ⊙

#### Share with people

- 1. Open the Find My app and select the People tab.
- 2. Tap the Add button +.



### iPhone: Safety Check









## **Personal Safety User Guide**


Keep yourself safe and your data private







### Need to secure the iCloud account!





### **Stalkerware**

### **Spyzie Setup Guide for iPhone**

Step by Step Guide to Setup Spyzie for iOS Devices.

Learn how to track an Android phone instead.

Spyzie's iOS tracker works like magic to track any iPhone or iPad remotely from any corner of the world. All that happens without the need to access the target iPhone or install any app on it. Here's how:

Part One: Things You Will Need to Track an iPhone/iPad

#### Spyzie Account with Subscription

Allows you access to Spyzie's dashboard to use all of its features

#### iCloud credentials of the target device

With the iCloud credentials, you can track any iPhone or iPad without touching it

Part Two: Steps to Spy on an iPhone in Secret

Read from <a href="https://spyzie.io/how-to-track-someone-iphone-location.html">https://spyzie.io/how-to-track-someone-iphone-location.html</a>



### iCloud 2FA





### Some stalkerware

https://xnspy.zohodesk.com/ portal/en/kb/articles/iphone-in stallation-guide-15-12-2014

### iPhone Installation Guide





On this page

All done! Now you can start monitoring target iPhone or iPad remotely by logging into your XNSPY Control Panel online.

Step 1: Tap on Cydia icon on your iPhone home screen.

Step 2: Tap on Sources at the bottom of the screen.

Step 3: Tap Edit on the right side of the screen.

Step 4: Tap Add on the left side of the screen.

Step 5: You will see a prompt to enter the download URL.

Step 6: Enter the URL, http://mydwnd.com and tap Add Source.

Step 7: Wait for the phone to verify the URL.

Step 8: Wait for the system to Update Sources.

Step 9: As the download gets complete, tap Return to Cydia.

Step 10: Tap MonitoringApp repo icon in the list you see.

### Check the list of apps from the backup

- Do an iPhone backup with iTunes / libimobiledevice (see <a href="https://docs.mvt.re/">https://docs.mvt.re/</a>)
- Analyze the backup with MVT

> mvt-ios check-backup -o results decrypted8

MVT - Mobile Verification Toolkit

\_stalkerware.stix2

List of apps is contained in Info.plist file

```
https://mvt.re
Version: 2.3.0
Indicators updates checked recently, next automatic check in 12 hours

[mvt.ios.cmd_check_backup] Parsing STIX2 indicators file at path
/home/etienne/.local/share/mvt/indicators/raw.githubusercontent.com_AssoEchap_stalkerware-indicators
```

### Check the list of apps from the backup

```
"name": "net.whatsapp.WhatsApp",
"DeviceBasedVPP": false,
"artistName": "WhatsApp Inc.",
"bundleShortVersionString": "23.5.78",
"bundleVersion": "456738319",
"com.apple.iTunesStore.downloadInfo": {
    "accountInfo": {
        "AltDSID": "000519-08-e1320e5c-2188-4bac-b18b-120067e4fba5",
        "AppleID": "
                                  :@icloud.com",
        "DSPersonID": 16813981945,
       "DownloaderID": 0,
       "FamilyID": 0,
        "PurchaserID": 16813981945
    "purchaseDate": "2019-08-29T23:26:54Z"
"gameCenterEnabled": false,
"gameCenterEverEnabled": false,
"genre": "Social Networking",
"genreId": 6005,
"hasMessagesExtension": false,
```



### Check the list of apps from the backup

```
"itemName": "WhatsApp Messenger",
"kind": "software",
"launchProhibited": false,
"rating": {
   "label": "12+",
   "rank": 300
"redownload-params": "productType=C&price=0&salableAdamId=310633997&pricingParameters=SWUPD",
"releaseDate": "2009-05-04T02:43:49Z",
"s": 143442,
"sideLoadedDeviceBasedVPP": false,
"softwareVersionBundleId": "net.whatsapp.WhatsApp",
  oftwareVersionExternalIdentifier": 855575888,
"sourceApp": "com.apple.AppStore",
storeconort": "/|date=156/11960000000&sf=143442&pgtp=Software&pgid=310633997&prpg=Software 310633
"subgenres": [],
"variantID": "1:iPhone9,3:13",
"isodate": "2019-08-29 21:26:54.000000",
"icon sha256": "cb575af8eebf548dfce840c247c7b163e67fa49c73008c967bc45a060485ff73"
```

# **Demo**

# **Android**

### **Android Devices**



- Many embedded options to share sensitive information such as geolocation
- Need to secure the related Google account
- Android Stalkerware exist

### **Sharing on Google Maps**

#### On some creepy websites:

## How to track Someone on Google maps without them knowing

By Barbara Thompson (3) Updated June 30, 2023

As parents, you always worry about your kids and prefer being able to track their cell phone location to know where they are. You sometimes also want to track the activity of your partner or spouse.

There are many techniques that allows you to keep an eye on your child or loved one who may be out of communication. These methods also let you determine where they are, what they're doing, and whether any potential danger is involved.

Here are some most used methods to track Someone on Google maps without them knowing:

#### Method 3: Using on Google Maps Location Sharing

How to track Someone using Location Sharing within the Google Maps app:

#### What is Location Sharing?

Location Sharing is an essential feature in Google Maps which enables users to share their GPS location with a specific contact. Friends or family mainly use it to share real-time Map of the locations.

#### What are things you need to Enable Location Sharing?

- Physical access to the Cell phone.
- You need a Pin or Password to unlock the phone device.
- Pre-installed Google Maps app.
- The user should be logged into their Google account.

#### How You can Enable Location Sharing in Google Maps

Here are steps for enabling Location Sharing using the Google Maps app:

- Step 1) First, Open the Settings option and check that ensure location tracking features are enabled
- Step 2) Open the Google Maps app Maps on the target Android phone.
- Step 3) Tap your right corner with the user's profile picture

and select the Location Sharing option

- Step 4) Tap On the "Share Location" option.
- Step 5) Then, tap "Until you turn this off"
- Step 6) Next, select your phone device

### **Checking shared features**

- No one place to check everything, need to check manually
- Geolocation: in Google maps or in the Google account "People and sharing tab"
- Pictures shared in Google Photos
- + Checks for apps with a lot of access

### **Android Stalkerware**

Let's see how it works
<a href="https://support.hoverwatch.com/hc/en-us/articles/207595389-How-to-len-us/articles/2075959-How-to-len-us/articles/20759

#### 1. Prepare the Device you Wish to Monitor

Prevent Android from asking questions about the activity of the monitoring program:

- 1. Tap the Google Play Store app.
- 2. Tap Menu > Play Protect > Settings.
- 3. Turn OFF Scan apps with Play Protect.



### **Stalkerware Features**

Category	Capabilities	mSPY	Mobile-tracker-free	Clevguard	HoverWatch	Flexispy	Spyic	Spyhuman	TheTruthSpy	iKeyMonitor	Cerberus	Spy24	Spapp	Meuspy	Highstermobile
	Ambient Recording		*			*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Calendar	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	Call Logs	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	Clipboard		*						*	*		*			
	Contacts	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Basic Capabilities (§ 3.2)	Info of Other Applications	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	Location	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	Network Info	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	Phone Info	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	SMS or MMS	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	Shared Media Files	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	Invisible camera access		*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Data Cathening (\$ 2.2)	Invisible microphone access		*	*	*	*		*	*	*		*	*	*	
Data Gathering (§ 3.3)	Accessing protected data	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	Taking screenshots	*	*	*	*			*		*		*	*	*	
	Hiding app icon	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Hiding the App (§ 3.4)	Launching a hidden app		*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Hide from recents screen	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*		*	*
Dargistanaa (\$ 2.5)	Obscuring the uninstallation process	*	*	*		*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Persistence (§ 3.5)	Creating "diehard" services	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
					11.21				1000				1000		_



Source: "No Privacy Among Spies" (PETS 2023)

### **IOCs**

https://github.co m/AssoEchap/sta lkerware-indicato rs/

jvoisin Updating generated i	e6f on May 31 🐧 <b>717</b> commits	
generated	Updating generated indicator files and README	2 months ago
tools	Adds tools	6 months ago
vendors	Updating generated indicator files and README	7 months ago
.flake8	Flake8 checks in scripts	last year
.gitignore	Update generation script and add linter	last year
README.md	Updating generated indicator files and README	2 months ago
ioc.yaml	Updating generated indicator files and README	2 months ago
quad9_blocklist.txt	Update readme and blocklist	last year
rules.yar	Updating generated indicator files and README	6 months ago
samples.csv	Updating generated indicator files and README	2 months ago

E README.md


### **Stalkerware Indicators of Compromise**

Indicators of compromise (IOC) for Stalkerware and Watchware applications for Android and iOS

Warning: these indicators are not providing a complete detection of stalkerware applications. They are based on research from a few people on their free time and many apps are likely missing. Use it carefully. No detection based

### **Checking with MVT**

Allow USB debugging first




### **Checking with MVT**

```
> mvt-android check-adb -o test mvt adb
       MVT - Mobile Verification Toolkit
               https://mvt.re
               Version: 2.3.0
                Indicators updates checked recently, next automatic check in 12 hours
                  [mvt.android.cmd_check_adb] Parsing STIX2 indicators file at path
                  /home/etienne/.local/share/mvt/indicators/raw.githubusercontent.com AssoEchap stalkerware-indicators master generated
                  stalkerware.stix2
00:38:11 INFO
                  [mvt.android.cmd_check_adb] Extracted 758 indicators for collection with name "TheTruthSpy"
                  [mvt.android.cmd_check_adb] Extracted 178 indicators for collection with name "HelloSpy"
                  [mvt.android.cmd_check_adb] Extracted 5 indicators for collection with name "SpyAdvice"
                  [mvt.android.cmd check adb] Extracted 91 indicators for collection with name "Reptilicus"
        INFO
                  [mvt.android.cmd check adb] Extracted 21 indicators for collection with name "PhoneSheriff"
        INFO
                  [mvt.android.cmd_check_adb] Extracted 15 indicators for collection with name "OwnSpy"
        INFO
                  [mvt.android.cmd_check_adb] Extracted 186 indicators for collection with name "Cocospy"
                  [mvt.android.cmd check adb] Extracted 8 indicators for collection with name "VIPTrack"
                  [mvt.android.cmd check adb] Extracted 74 indicators for collection with name "EasyLogger"
        INFO
        INFO
                  [mvt.android.cmd check adb] Extracted 106 indicators for collection with name "Hoverwatch"
        INFO
                  [mvt.android.cmd_check_adb] Extracted 28 indicators for collection with name "LetMeSpy"
                  [mvt.android.cmd_check_adb] Extracted 41 indicators for collection with name "Snoopza"
        INFO
        INFO
                  [mvt.android.cmd_check_adb] Extracted 31 indicators for collection with name "TrackMyPhones"
```

		[mvt.android.modules.adb.settings] Running module Settings
00:39:08		[mvt.android.modules.adb.settings] Found suspicious setting "samsung_errorlog_agree = 0" (disabled sharing of crash logs with manufacturer)
		<pre>[mvt.android.modules.adb.settings] Found suspicious setting "install_non_market_apps = 1" (enabled installation of non Google Play apps)</pre>
		<pre>[mvt.android.modules.adb.settings] Found suspicious setting "package_verifier_user_consent = -1" (disabled Google Play Protect)</pre>
00:39:14	INFO	[mvt.android.modules.adb.dumpsys_accessibility] Running module DumpsysAccessibility
	INFO	[mvt.android.modules.adb.dumpsys_accessibility] Found installed accessibility service
	INFO	<pre>"com.android.settings/com.samsung.android.settings.development.gpuwatch.GPUWatchInterceptor" [mvt.android.modules.adb.dumpsys_accessibility] Found installed accessibility service</pre>
	INFO	<pre>"com.samsung.accessibility/.universalswitch.UniversalSwitchService"</pre>
	INFO	[mvt.android.modules.adb.dumpsys_accessibility] Found installed accessibility service
		"com.samsung.accessibility/com.samsung.android.app.talkback.TalkBackService"
	INFO	[mvt.android.modules.adb.dumpsys_accessibility] Found installed accessibility service
		com.sec.android.app.camera/com.samsung.android.glview.AccessibilityGestureHandler"
	INFO	<pre>[mvt.android.modules.adb.dumpsys_accessibility] Found installed accessibility service "com.dy.spyzie.v4/com.dy.services.NeNotificationService02"</pre>
	INFO	[mvt.android.modules.adb.dumpsys_accessibility] Found installed accessibility service
	2111	"com.kms.free/com.kaspersky.components.accessibility.KasperskyAccessibility"
	INFO	[mvt.android.modules.adb.dumpsys_accessibility] Identified a total of 6 accessibility services
	WARNING	[mvt.android.modules.adb.dumpsys_accessibility] Found a known suspicious app with ID "com.dy.spyzie.v4" matching
		indicators from "Cocospy"
	INFO	[mvt.android.modules.adb.packages] Extracted at total of 348 installed package names
00:43:42	WARNING	[mvt.android.modules.adb.packages] Found a known suspicious app with ID "com.dy.spyzie.v4" matching indicators from
		"Cocospy"
	INFO	[mvt.android.modules.adb.logcat] Running module Logcat
00:43:44		[mvt.android.modules.adb.logcat] Current logcat logs stored at test_mvt_adb/logcat.txt
	INFO	[mvt.android.modules.adb.logcat] Logcat logs prior to last reboot stored at test_mvt_adb/logcat_last.txt

# **Demo**

### spytrap-adb





### **Our Android Checklist**

- Check Android account (and secure it)
- Check shared geolocation in Google Maps
- Check shared photo albums
- Check apps that are device admin
- Look for stalkerware
  - Check if Play Protect is disabled
  - Check if the phone is rooted with Root Verifier
  - If needed: check with MVT / antivirus


# Computers

### Computers



- Several stalkerware have a Windows version
- AFAIK not possible to share geolocation through standard interface
- Some simple tools to look for suspicious programs

### **Autoruns**






Ready.

No Filter.

### **Running Processes**



### **Review network connections**

🔬 TCPView - Sy	sinternals: www.sy	sinternals.com					-	п ×		
File Options I	Process View H	Help								
<b>□</b> A → ②										
Process /	PID	Protocol	Local Address		Local P	ort Remote Address	Remote Port	State ^		
System Proc   System Proc   GasHost.exe   dasHost.exe   lasss.exe   MicrosoftEdg   SearchUI.exe   Search	0 1016 1016 1016 1016 1016 1016 552 8780 8780 8780 8780 8780 8780 8780 878	TCP TCP UDP UDP UDP UDPV6 UDPV6 UDPV6 TCP	msedgewin10.phub MSEDGEWIN10 MSEDGEWIN10 MSEDGEWIN10 msedgewin10 msedgewin10 msedgewin10 msedgewin10 msedgewin10.phub	net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com net.cable.rogers.com	57458 57473 ws-disco ws-disco 50239 3702 3702 50240 49669 49669 49669 57202 57203 57204 57205 57206 57207 57208 57207 57208 57207 57218 57229 57219 57219 57220 57220 57225 49668 49668		http https *  *  *  0  0 https	TIME_\ TIME_\ TIME_\  LISTEN LISTEN CLOSE, ESTAB LISTEN		
spoolsv.exe spoolsv.exe svchost.exe svchost.exe svchost.exe	1880 1880 772 2412 1036	TCP TCPV6 TCP TCP TCP TCP	MSEDGEWIN10 msedgewin10 MSEDGEWIN10 MSEDGEWIN10 MSEDGEWIN10		49667 49667 epmap 5040 49665	MSEDGEWIN10 msedgewin10 MSEDGEWIN10 MSEDGEWIN10 MSEDGEWIN10	0 0 0 0	LISTEN LISTEN LISTEN LISTEN V		
< svciloscexe	1000	TOIS.	MOLDGEWINTO		43003	MOLDALWINIO	·	>		
Endpoints: 87	Established: 21	Listening 26	Time Wait: 2	Close Wait: 4						

# Conclusion

## **Thanks**

- Echap : https://echap.eu.org/
- IPV Tech bibliography: https://ipvtechbib.randhome.io/
- Email: etienne@maynier.eu